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Post-socialist economic declines have included declines in women’s use of maternal health care.  This 
paper examines the use of maternal health care in Tajikistan, where such declines have occurred.  The 
findings support previous evidence that women’s use of services depends on women’s education, 
household income, and proximity of services.  Previous models have not specified who makes the care 
decision.  Using education as a proxy for preferences, the findings show that women share decision-
making with their spouse and the eldest female in the household.  However, the data provides limited 
evidence that traditional proxies for bargaining power affect outcomes.  The authors conclude that 
measures of bargaining power require tailoring to local conditions.  Surveys evaluating the value of 
women’s assets and their services in the home, as well as questions about decision-making, will allow 
researchers to more effectively measure bargaining power across contexts.  The paper concludes with 
policy recommendations. Introduction 
 
The  collapse of socialism in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was 
followed by a radical decline in GDP and related decline in health indicators (Meurs and Ranasinghe, 
2002).  Many countries experienced an increase in infant and maternal mortality rates. In most cases, 
these mortality rates fell again over time, but in some of the poorer former Soviet countries, the 
mortality rates have remained stubbornly high (UNICEF, 2007; 2008). 
  Underlying the rise in mortality has been a decline in women’s  use of prenatal care and 
professional assistance during birth.  Previous models of women’s use of these health services have 
focused on factors including women’s education, household income, and proximity of services.  This 
approach does not specify whether the decision was made by the woman herself, the household as unit, 
or some other actor, but appears to assume a unified household as decision-maker. Recently, researchers 
have begun including measures of women’s bargaining power (in marriage) in modeling maternal health 
care use, suggesting women may share decision-making with their spouse (Beegle, Frankenberg and 
Thomas, 2001; Furuta and Salway, 2006; Bloom, Wypij, and das Gupta, 2001). 
  In this paper, we explicitly address an issue of importance to feminist economists—the problem 
of how to adequately model household bargaining in widely differing cultural and economic contexts.  
We examine the use of maternal health care in one poor post-socialist country, Tajikistan, where use of 
prenatal care and medical assistance at birth has declined substantially.  Using data from the 2003 and 
2007 Tajikistan Living Standards Surveys (TLSS), we build on previous work by Falkingham (2003), 
Habibov and Fan (2008), and Fan and Habibov (2009) documenting recent trends in the use of these 
services.  Extending previous research, we explicitly examine the role of household members other than 
the women herself in the decision to use maternal health care and, finding that others do seem to play a 
role, examine the impact of possible sources of women’s bargaining power regarding the use of care.    Tajikistan provides a particularly interesting case for such a study, because of the substantial 
decline in  the use of maternal health care during the post-socialist period.  In addition, as will be 
discussed further below, most women live in extended families, where a number of different people may 
influence decisions about care.  Labor force participation rates for women are low, and exit from 
marriage and formation of female headed households is quite unusual (Harris, 2004).  In this context, it 
is unclear whether commonly used measures of women’s household bargaining power will be related to 
care use.  
  Consistent with the previous work on the use of maternal health care in Tajijkistan, we find that 
higher household income and education of the woman have a consistent, positive impact on use of both 
prenatal care and the presence of professional assistance at birth.  Living in a more remote or socially 
conservative location with poor health quality also has a significant negative impact.  Examining the 
question of who makes decisions about care, we consider the role of both the spouse and the oldest 
female in the household, taking into account the patrilocal and multigenerational nature of households in 
Tajikistan.  We find evidence that both the women’s spouse and the oldest woman in the household play 
a role in decision about care, using education as a proxy for preferences.  We use the regression results 
to predict the likelihood of getting care for individuals with different characteristics, examining 
particularly the impact of variations in the relative education of the woman and her spouse.  We show 
that increases in women’s education have a greater positive impact than increases in spousal education, 
suggesting that women may have a relatively larger role in the decisions than do their spouses.   
  We find that standard measures of bargaining power (relative earnings potential, for example) do 
not have an impact on the use of maternal health care.  We find this result to be consistent with gender 
relations and other conditions in Tajikistan, where female labor force participation is low and women’s 
ability to exit her spouse’s household is limited by a variety of social factors.  We discuss, in conclusion, the need to tailor measures of bargaining power more carefully to local conditions, and the need to 
collect data to support more diverse and refined measures of bargaining power.  One important advance, 
we argue, would be more theoretical development and data collection (perhaps starting with interviews) 
for estimating women’s sources of bargaining power within a relationship, for use in contexts where exit 
options are limited.  In concluding, we also highlight other policy recommendations.   
 
Understanding Use of Maternal Health Care 
  The literature on maternal and infant outcomes in developed and developing countries identifies 
a number of factors consistently correlated with mortality rates, including the use of prenatal care and 
the presence of trained assistance during birth (Flegg, 1982; Shiffman, 2000; Celik and Hotchkiss, 
2000).
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  Researchers have thus focused on the factors contributing to women’s use of prenatal care and 
medical assistance at birth.  The majority of studies focus on demand-side issues—factors which 
contribute to women’s use of care.  In cross-country research using data from both developed and 
developing countries, researchers  find  that more educated women are more likely to seek quality 
medical care (Flegg, 1982: 443; Shiffman, 2000:281).  The authors suggest that the relationship may be 
due to  better educated women being better informed about the benefits of care (a change in their 
preferences) or in them being more highly valued by their family, leaving uncertain whom is the 
hypothesized decision-maker.  Wealth and better infrastructure are also found to increase women’s use 
of prenatal and delivery care in developing countries (Sundari, 1992).   
  Pre-natal care is important in identifying underlying conditions which  contribute to poor 
maternal and infant outcomes, and also in informing women about nutrition and hygiene (Shiffman, 
2000; Sundari, 1992).  The presence of professional assistance at birth is particularly important to both 
mother and infant in the case of high-risk births.    Social norms also influence the choices about care.  Studying changing birthing practices in 
Tatarstan and Russia in the 19
th and 20
th centuries, Ransel found a “generational chain of knowledge, 
norms and assistance that strongly reinforced traditional practices.” Even when medical services became 
available, practices changed slowly.  It took time for medical assistance to be incorporated into the 
norms passed down to, and expected of, young women (2001: 3).  .   
  The demand-side factors described above include women’s education and norms (which may 
affect preferences of decision-makers), household financial resources, and infrastructure (particularly 
transportation infrastructure), which affects households’ ability to express a demand for services.  A 
simple version of this model, which does not specify a decision-maker, might look like Figure 1.   
   









  Increasingly, however, explanations of demand for care have considered the impact of women’s 
decision-making power and  autonomy on the use of care (Beegle, Frankenberg and Thomas, 2001; 
Bloom, Wypij and das Gupta, 2001; Furuta and Salway, 2006).  Social scientists have characterized 
women’s influence differently, considering women’s “autonomy,” “position,” and “bargaining power” 
(or just “power”).  These concepts encompass similar characteristics  and have similar predictive 
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Women’s Education implications.  For example, Bloom,  Wypij and das Gupta (2001) examine women’s  “control over 
finances, decision-making power, and freedom of movement” as elements of autonomy.  In looking at 
the role of women’s position  in care use  in Nepal, Furuta and Salway (2006) consider women’s 
employment, participation in household decision making and ability to discuss family planning with 
their husband. The autonomy and position approaches focus on the characteristics of the woman herself, 
but they do not state explicitly whether the women or the household is thought to make care decisions, 
or how decisions might be shared by household members. 
  The bargaining power approach is somewhat more specific in its description of decision-making, 
having emerged as critique of models in which “unitary households” are specifically posited as decision-
makers.  The bargaining models highlight the need to consider how decision-making might be shared, 
with women’s influence varying with bargaining power (Ghysles, 2004: Ch. 1). To the extent that the 
woman’s preferences are not given full weight, the preferences of other household members also impact 
the decision. In this case, the education of the other household members, as well as social norms, may 
play an important role in determining what kind of care women get.  However, bargaining power models 
have generally not tested directly for the influence of other household members in decision-making.   
  Women’s bargaining power is thought to derive, at least in part, from women’s relative ability 
(compared to her bargaining partner) to walk away from a relationship, or to withhold valuable services 
within it (Lundberg and Pollack, 1994).  Attempts to measure this power have frequently relied on 
indirect methods--measuring characteristics which are thought to convey power.  Characteristics such as 
education and employment might allow a woman to survive economically outside the relationship (Ross, 
1987; Bittman, et. al, 2003; Acharya and Bennet, 1983),  so  may enhance a threat to walk away.  
Ownership of assets, especially those brought into the marriage, is also thought to convey bargaining 
power in fertility and other decisions (Ransul, 2007; Doss, 1996), possibly also because these may allow women to leave the relationship.  Although less often used in empirical work, social norms have also 
been argued to increase the weight of women’s preferences in certain decisions (Folbre, 1994).  
  Economists studying maternal health care use within a bargaining power framework have relied 
less on the direct measures of power used by researchers studying “autonomy” or “empowerment”--like 
self-reported influence on decisions.  Such measures have been begun to be used in models of other 
household outcomes, such as savings among households in the Philippines (Malapit, 2009).   
  Examining the impact of women’s autonomy, power, and bargaining power on decisions about 
reproductive care, researchers have generally found a positive effect, when controlling for subsets of the 
demand-side variables included in Figure 1  (Beegle, Frankenberg, and Thomas, 2001;   Furuta and 
Salway, 2006).  Authors emphasize, however, that the impact of women’s status, empowerment, or 
bargaining power is complex (Woldemicael, 2007).  The specific factors which convey decision-making 
influence in one context may not convey it in others.  For example, studying use of maternal health care 
in Uttar Pradesh, Bloom, Wypij and das Gupta (2001) found that freedom of movement affected the use 
of prenatal care and delivery care, but control over finances and general decision-making power did not.  
In Nepal, Furuta and Salway (2006) found that participation in decisions  about large household 
purchases positively affected the likelihood of receiving prenatal care, but not the likelihood of skilled 
assistance at birth.  Conversely, women’s ability to discuss family planning with their spouse positively 
affected the likelihood of skilled assistance at birth, but not that of getting prenatal care.  
Further,  resources such as education,  income  and assets which enhance women’s ability to 
survive economically outside the relationship may not convey bargaining power where legal rights and 
social norms limit women’s ability to leave (Malapit, 2009; Folbre, 1997; Frankenberg and Thomas, 
2003).  Looking at fertility decisions among Chinese and Malay communities in Malaysia, Rasul (2008) 
concludes that differing divorce norms across communities contribute to differences in the impact of asset-holding  plays on  fertility decisions.  Where divorce is rare, assets do not appear to impact 
bargaining.  When strict social norms prevent divorce, women’s bargaining power may depend more on 
the value of their role inside the relationship, especially the services they provide to their spouse or head 
of household (Lundberg and Pollack, 1994).  Data suitable for measuring this source of bargaining 
power have been less available.  In this paper, we follow the majority of economists, examining whether 
factors which may convey decision-making power affect the use of maternal health care.  However, we 
also directly examine the role of household members other than the woman herself in the decision. 
  Our approach is a modification of the model depicted in Figure 1, which we present in Figure 2.  
This model includes household income and infrastructure, as before.  In the modified model, we include 
household structure (which determines who might co-participate in decisions and their position relative 
to the woman), culture (which may influence the preferences of household members, as well as social 
norms regarding the weight of women’s preferences in specific decisions, in addition to the norms about 
birthing practices included in Figure 1), and the education (a proxy for preferences) of household 
members with whom the women may share decision-making power (her spouse and the oldest female in 
the household, usually her spouse’s mother).   Women’s education relative to other household members 
contributes to her bargaining power in this model, although we continue to recognize and discuss her 
own level of education as a proxy for her preferences.  As noted above, women’s education may also 
contribute to also contribute to the way other household decision-makers value her health. 












   
     
 
 
Supply side factors—availability and quality of maternal health services—have also been also been 
found to play an important role in use. Reviewing literature on maternal health care in developing 
countries, Gupta (1989) finds that access and quality of services play a bigger role than user 
characteristics in explaining use.  Distance, as well as inadequate supplies and poor service provision, 
are also important in explaining use of care in developing countries (Sundari, 1992; Hotchkiss, 2001).    
 
Tajikistan: Background 
  In this section, we draw on both secondary sources and our own analysis of the 2003 and 2007 
Living Standards Survey in the Republic of Tajikistan (TLSS, 2003; 2007) to review of trends in the use 
of maternal health services and changes in factors considered as independent variables in the model.  We 
provide a further discussion of the survey data below.    
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Employment   Use of Maternal Health Services 
  During the early  Soviet period, maternal health care  services expanded through the use  of 
feldshers  (physician’s assistants or paramedics).  By the 1950s, access  to medical care improved 
substantially (Harris, 2006:28), but then started to deteriorate in the 1960s (Ransel, 2000:146).  By the 
1980s, a widespread crisis in health care (Becker, 1998: 2057) forced people to bring their own bedding 
and food to maternity hospitals.  Some avoided hospitals for births (Ransel, 2000).   
  According to official data, the share of births attended by skilled personnel fell from 93% in 
1989 to 75% in 2003, before recovering very slightly (UNICEF, 2007).  Using the 1999 TLSS, Jane 
Falkingham (2003) documented a similar significant decline in use both of prenatal care and medical 
assistance at birth from 1989-1999.  In Tables 1a and 1b, we report the percentage of sample women 
using both types of care by year of their most recent birth, based on the 2003 and 2007 TLSS surveys.  
As can be seen, the downward trend in care use care, reported by Falkingham based on the 1999 data 
(2003),  continued  through the early late 1990s, and then improved slightly (unsteadily, on some 
indicators) in the 2000s.  Although the share of women recalling use of care is consistently higher in the 
2007 data than in the 2003 data, the trends are fairly consistent across the surveys (Tables 1a and 1b).
2
  The rates of use of medical assistance are still reasonable by comparison with other countries at a 
similar level of development.  For comparison, in Turkey, where GDP per capita is substantially higher 
than in Tajikistan (UNESCO, 2008), 1993 only 63% of births were to mothers who had received 
prenatal care, and 76% of births were attended by skilled personnel (Celik and Hotchkiss, 2000:1798).  
However, the decline is likely to undermine efforts to improve infant and maternal outcomes and to 




Table 1a: Percent Using Maternal Health Services, By Date of Last Birth, 2003 Survey 
  Date Last Birth            












Prenatal Consult   94.74  92.02  88.98  87.40  85.43  82.35 
Place of Delivery             
     Medical Facility   92.11  81.19  77.12  73.58  68.02  61.49 
     Home,with Medical Professional   2.63  6.95  6.95  11.79  16.19  12.99 
     Home, No Medical Professional  5.26  11.86  15.93  14.63  15.79  25.52 
Medical Professional, regardless of 
location of delivery  
94.74  88.14  84.07  85.37  84.21  74.48 
N = 3,694             
 
 
Table 1b: Percent Using Maternal Health Services, By Date of Last Birth, 2007 Survey 
  Date Last Birth             














Prenatal Consult   89.47  89.69  85.31  83.57  89.37  87.65  86.07 
Place of Delivery               
     Medical Facility   84.21  83.84  67.50  62.14  71.25  63.42  70.82 
     Home, Medical   Professional  2.11  3.90  7.81  10.71  9.38  9.84  7.58 
     Home, No Medical Professional  13.68  12.26  24.69  27.14  19.38  26.74  21.60 
Medical Professional, regardless of 
location of delivery  
86.32  87.74  75.31  72.86  80.63  73.26  78.40 
N = 4,420               
 
  Underlying Factors 
  At the end of the Soviet period, Tajikistan was among the poorest of the Soviet Republics. 
Economic conditions worsened after 1991.  The post-socialist economic downturn was exacerbated by a 
civil war, from October 1992 to May 1993 and skirmishes which continued into 1996 and even 200l 
(Gomart, 2003; Jeffries, 2003: 269-272).  GDP per capita collapsed, falling more dramatically than in 
any other Central Asian country, from $501 in 1989 to $139 in 1996, before recovering somewhat, to 
$234 in 2005 (in constant 2000 USD) (UNICEF, 2008).   
Household Income 
  Ability to pay for medical services has also become increasingly uneven, with the Gini 
coefficient for per capita household income rising from around 0.308 in 1988  to 0.47 in the late 1990s (Falkingham, 2000).  Poverty rates are highest in the regions of Gorno-Badakhshan and Khatlon, less 
developed areas affected by war and de-industrialization (State Statistical Committee Tajikistan, 2008).   
 
  Despite relatively severe repression of Islamic practices during the Soviet period, and the general 
replacement of the veil with a headscarf, researchers reported continued preferences for female seclusion 
and early marriage for girls (Harris, 2004).  Still, during the Soviet period girls got almost as much 
education as boys.  In 1986, about nine adult women had completed college for every ten men who had 
done so, and the same was true for high school (USSR Central Statistical Office, 1986: 28).  Since 1999, 
however, girls’ enrollment rates have declined.  Over the period 1999-2005, girls’ secondary school 
enrollment hovered around 84% of boys’ enrollment (UNESCO, 2008).  Overall enrollment in tertiary 
education is low.  Among the limited number of post-secondary students, boys far outnumber girls, with 
young women making up only about 34% of students in 1998/99 and 2002/03 (UNESCO, 2005:102). 
Female Education and Employment 
  Despite the declines in enrollment, TLSS data suggest that the pre-1989 trend of increasing 
education continued to raise the average level of education for women of childbearing age through 2007.  
From 2003 to 2007, the average number of years of education for women in our sample (see below) rose 
from approximately 10 to 10.5, a small but statistically significant increase. Education levels of spouses 
in our sample increased slightly as well (Table 2). 
During the Soviet period, women in Tajikistan had low labor force participation rates by Soviet 
standards, around 52% in 1990 (UNDP, 2007/8: 340).  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
overall employment ratio has fallen, from 72% of the working age population in 1991 to 59% in 1999 
and 52% in 2003 (UNICEF, 2007).  Women’s employment rate may have risen during the economic 
collapse, but by 2005, reported female economic participation rates were only 47% (Falkingham and 
Bashieri, 2004; UNDP, 2007/8:340).  In our sample, participation is even lower, 36% (Table 2).  
Household Structure
Traditionally, women in Tajikistan join the household of their spouse when they marry.  The 
position of daughter-in-law has been traditionally associated with submission to, and direction by, her 
spouse’s mother (Harris, 2006).    Women’s choices about care may need to be discussed (bargained) 
with her mother-in-law, as well as her spouse. 
: 
Since 1999, civil war and the migration of men for work have contributed to a decline in the 
prevalence of the traditional patri-local family.  The majority of women of childbearing age continue to 
live with their spouse or extended family, however.  Among all women who answered the female survey 
(given to women of childbearing age), 93% lived with their spouse in 2003 and 85% did in 2007.  Of the 
women not living with their spouse, about 79% lived with their in-laws in 2003 and 70% did so in 2007. 
Among women in our sample (see below), the share who were the head of household fell slightly, from 
3.7% in 2003 to 2.9% in 2007 (Table 2). 
 
  One factor which may affect women’s bargaining power and use of medical care in Tajikistan is 




  Just as in the 1920s and 1930s when ideological battles in Central Asia centered on the role of 
women (whether women should unveil, whether to end seclusion) (Northrop, 2004), current ideological 
battles emphasize the need for Tajikistani women to distinguish themselves culturally from “Russian” 
 during the Soviet period, and the 1992 civil war was partly driven by the resurgence of Islam 
in some areas, and conflicts between secular and Islamic visions for the new state. Even in the more 
“pro-communist” areas, Islamic symbols and practices have become much more predominant since 1989 
(Tett, 1994:146-7; Harris, 2004).  The vast majority of Tajikistanis now identify as Muslim, most 
belonging to the Sunni branch of Islam (Curtis, 1996).   (“colonialist”) women (Tett, 1994) by becoming more visibly “Muslim.”  These changes may influence 
women’s own preferences about medical care (by reducing women’s willingness to be examined by a 
male doctor, for example), as well as their ability and desire to assert their preferences if these are in 
conflict with those of elders or spouses.   
  Access to Care
  State spending on health care in Tajikistan during the Soviet period was low by Soviet standards 
(Curtis, 1996).  The number of hospital beds per 1000 population was well below the average for the 
Soviet Union as a whole, and rural areas had about half the number per population as the capital, 
Dushanbe.  There were reports of a lack of hot water and inadequate plumbing in hospitals 
(Komsomol’skaia Pravda, 1988, cited in Olcott, 1991: 252; Curtis, 1996).   
: 
  Still, health care was universally accessible and free.  While hospital beds were in short supply, 
urban centers offered polyclinics for prenatal care and more centralized hospitals or maternity centers 
for giving birth.  Rural areas were more likely to receive periodic visits by ambulatory polyclinics and 
offer midwives or feldshers for birthing (Rivkin-Fish, 2005).   
  As GDP collapsed, the share of GDP spent on health care also fell dramatically, from 3.4% in 
1993 to 0.9 from 2000-2004, and 1.1% in 2005-2006.   The number of available hospital beds per 
10,000 population fell 32% from 1991-2004 (to under 41 per 10,000), while the capacity of polyclinics 
remained about the same (State Statistical Committee Tajikistan, 2008).  As the Soviet Union 
disintegrated and civil war broke out, many doctors (many of whom were non-indigenous nationalities) 
left the country (Curtis, 1996), reducing the number of doctors per 10,000 population from 26 to 19 over 
the period 1991-2004. The number of paramedical personnel fell even more dramatically, from 77 per 
10,000 to 42 (State Statistical Committee Tajikistan, 2008).   Conditions in health care facilities, which 
had been poor, deteriorated further.  The civil war also damaged important infrastructure necessary to both access and run medical facilities, while continuing skirmishes and road blocks perpetuated fear and 
limited population movement (Gomart, 2003; Jeffries, 2003: 269-272).       
  The changes since 1991 negatively affected many of the determinants of maternal health case use 
outlined in Figure 2, although some factors have subsequently improved somewhat.  Household incomes 
have fallen, roads and other transportation infrastructure have been damaged, women have less access to 
employment and secondary education and, although men’s employment and school enrollment has also 
declined, less relative to their spouses.  Other conservative cultural changes have occurred in some 
areas.  Below, we evaluate the relative role of these factors in women’s use of the medical services.   
 
Data and Methodology 
  In her analysis of the 1999 Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (TLSS), Jane Falkingham (2003) 
showed that significant differences existed in care, depending on education, location, wealth, and year of 
last birth.  More educated women were more likely to get prenatal care, and poorer women were much 
less likely to have skilled assistance at birth.  Using the 2003 TLSS data, Habibov and Fan (2008) 
confirm that that education increased use of prenatal care, while poverty, poor quality of care, and 
remoteness reduced the probability of use.  
  We develop a model similar to that used by Falkingham (2003) and Habibov and Fan (2008), 
incorporating data from 2007 TLSS.  We extend their work by specifically examining women’s role in 
the decisions about care and the impact of bargaining power on outcomes.   
 
 
 Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses)
a,b 
  2003 
 
2007  Both Years 
Number of Women aged 15-50  1,932  2,519  4,451 
Number of Women aged 15-50 
with identifiable spouses 
1,812  2,116  3,928 
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a) The sample includes women who answered the female questionnaire in each year, including only women whose year of 
last birth was within five years of the survey year (starting in 1998 and 2002 for the two surveys, respectively) and who had 
identifiable spouses.  The sample weights are used in the calculation of the means.  
b) ) Means and Standard Deviations are based on the weighted data.   
c) The question reads “How many children have you given birth to? Please include births where the child only lived a few 
short hours or died later.” 
d) Note, for those questions and regressions involving this variable (respondent is the head), we include households whose 
husband is not identifiable as well as those for whom husbands are identifiable. This sample is n = 4,451. 
 
  The  2003  and 2007 TLSS  were  designed and conducted jointly by the Tajikistan  National 
Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat),  UNICEF, and the World Bank. Both  of  the  cross-sectional 
surveys are multi-topic, nationally representative household surveys. The sampling frames were both 
based on a two-stage sample stratified by region (oblast) and urban/rural settlements, with the share of 
each stratum in the overall sample being in proportion to its share in the total number of households as 
recorded in the 1989 and 2000 Censuses. After stratification, the 2003 survey consists of 208 population 
points chosen as primary sampling units while the 2007 survey consists of 270 population points. The 











Respondent has more education 
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Source: TLSS,2003, 2007.       2003 and 2007 samples included an oversampling of the capital Dushanbe, and the province of Gorno 
Badakhshian, which we account for using the weights provided by the World Bank.
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The 2003 survey was based on a sample of 4,156 households for a total of over 26,000 
individuals.  The 2007 survey sampled 4,860 households for a total of nearly 31,000 individuals. Our 
analysis relies on a subsample of women between the ages of 15 and 50 who report having been 
pregnant at least once, and who answered a series of questions regarding the medical attention that they 
sought and received for their last (most recent) pregnancy.    Because we are interested in the way 
household and community characteristics may affect maternal health care, and those characteristics are 
measured only for the survey year itself, we restricted our sample to women who had given birth within 
five years of the survey.  While this does not assure that the household and community characteristics 
measured in the survey capture those prevalent at the time of the decision, this choice is necessary to 
maintain a reasonable sample size.  The most important changes to most households’ situation (loss of 
formal employment due to economic restructuring or displacement due to the civil war) would probably 
have occurred earlier than 1999, the most recent birth year included in our survey, rather than after it.
  
5
Because we are particularly interested in who makes the care decision in households and whether 
women’s characteristics affect their role in decision-making (bargaining power), for most of the analysis 
we further restricted our sample to women with an identifiable spouse.  This results in an additional 
small loss of cases (Table 2).  These subsamples consisted of 1,812 women in the 2003 survey and 2,116 
women in the 2007 survey. Not all women answered the questions regarding use of prenatal care or 
presence of skilled assistance at birth, however, and some data was missing for other variables, 
particularly education.  For the regression analysis below, we have a total of 3,146 usable cases.
  
6
However, for one set of regressions we used a slightly different sample.  We examine the use of 
care when the respondent herself is the reported head of household and thus the presumed decision-
    maker.  In these regressions, we included all women who had given birth during the relevant period and 
who had answered the questions about seeking medical assistance, regardless of whether they reported 
having a spouse.  For these regressions we had a sample size of 4451.  
  Lacking time series data to explain the change in use of maternal medical services over time, we 
use a cross-sectional approach and examine factors correlated with two outcomes: use of prenatal care 
and birthing with professional assistance.
7  To measure use of prenatal care, we consider two binomial 
outcomes: whether the woman receives any medical exam prior to the birth, and a dummy for whether 
she attends more than 4 prenatal visits.  In using a dummy variable to measure of level of attendance of 
prenatal visits, we follow Hotchkiss (2001).
8
  Following previous work, we examine the role of the respondent’s education, as a proxy for her 
preferences. We include household income per capita (measured as expenditure per capita, in log form, 
in constant 2007 US dollars) as a measure of households’ ability to pay for care.  After multiple births, 
women may be less likely to seek care (Celik and Hotchkiss, 2000).  To control for this, we include the 
total number of children born to this woman. 
 This allows us to examine factors behind the repeated use 
of care—more than one visit per trimester—while overcoming some apparent inconsistencies between 
the two survey years in the top-coding of visits.   We chose 4 as the cutoff for the dummy variable 
because it represented a break in the data: in both 2003 and 2007 the number of women reporting a 
given number of visits dropped off markedly after 4. We define professional assistance as the presence 
of a doctor or nurse at the birth and measure use of professional care as a dummy variable. 
  We include two measure of access to medical care: population of the locality (population point) 
as defined in the World Bank survey and distance (in kilometers) to the closest clinic.
9  More populous 
localities are expected to provide easier access to services due to the availability of better transport 
infrastructure. Distance to the closest clinic provides the most direct measure of access.  A third measure of the supply is the perceived quality of health care in the population point.  We use a dummy for poor 
quality if the respondent chose “bad” on a 4 point scale (excellent, good, satisfactory, bad). 
  To better understand the woman’s relative role in the decision about care, we examine 
correlations between care use and the education of the woman’s spouse and the eldest female in the 
household.  We assume that better educated spouses and eldest females will, like more educated women, 
prefer more care.  We are able to measure separate effects of the education of different household 
members on the outcomes because of relatively low levels of assortative mating in our sample.
10
  We examine the role of spouses and eldest females (usually the spouse’s mother) separately.  In 
many cases the respondent is herself the eldest female.  In these cases, there is no other “eldest female” 
household member who participates in the decision, and her  education  cannot be included in the 
regression.   For the regression examining the role of the eldest female in decision making, therefore, the 
number of cases falls substantially, to 1570.  We examine the link between spouse education and 
outcomes in the full sample.  
   
  In a further set of regressions, we consider the impact of several measures of the woman’s 
bargaining power on use of care.  As noted above, most attempts to examine the impact of a woman’s 
bargaining power on household outcomes have relied on measures potential power, especially their 
relative education, income or assets.  Some studies have also attempted to include direct measures of 
women’s participation in household decisions, such as  self-reported evaluations of their role, or 
evaluations by both the woman and her spouse (Malapit, 2009).   
  The TLSS provides no data on assets brought to the marriage or currently held by the individual 
spouses, however, and data on income were very incomplete.  As a measure of relative education, we 
included a dummy for whether the woman had more education than her spouse or the eldest female in 
her household.
11 As a measure of relative access to income, we included a dummy for whether or not the woman reported working for pay at all in the past year.
12  We also included two direct measures of 
bargaining power.  Partially following Furutu and Salway (2006), who included a dummy for whether 
the woman had discussed family planning with their husbands, we included a dummy for whether the 
reason for not using contraceptives was the husband’s opposition.  Non-use due to spousal opposition 
would suggest a lack of bargaining power on reproductive health issues.  As a second direct measure of 
bargaining power, we include a dummy for whether the respondent  is identified as the head of 
household.
13
  As a very rough measure of differences in culture, we include a set of regional dummies for the 
five  administrative regions.    The survey does not ask questions about religious affiliation or other 
cultural values, and the vast majority of Tajikistanis identify as Muslims, so that a basic variable on 
religious affiliation would provide little additional information. Ethnic identity is asked only in the 2007 
survey, but not the 2003 survey.  Since regional differences in development and infrastructure should be 
largely controlled for by measures of remoteness and household income per capita in the regression, we 
expect our regional controls to partially reflect differences in ethnic makeup and culture.  Dushanbe, as 
the capital, was most affected by Soviet culture and Western influence that other areas.  Dushanbe is the 
reference category for the regional dummies.  Khatlon is among the most socially conservative regions, 
and has a large Uzbek population. Data from the 1980s and the current period show that the region had 
lower female labor force participation rates and lower rates of enrollment of six year olds in school than 
other regions  (Falkingham and Baschieri, 2004; USSR Central Statistical Office, 1986).  Strong 
  As can be seen in Table 2, the level of variation in the bargaining power variables is 
mixed.  Relatively few childbearing women are heads of household (about 3% of the sample); more are 
employed (over a third).  The share of women with more education than their spouse, or not using 
contraceptives due to spousal opposition is under 10%. Between a quarter and a third of respondents 
living with an elder female had more education than the elder female (Table 2).   conservative values may have contributed to a heavy impact of the Civil War in this region.  Like 
Khatlon, the RRS administrative district also has a large, conservative, Uzbek population.  Gorno-
Badakhshan has the highest share of Russian population in the country (4%), and is home to the Pamir 
ethnic minority, creating a distinct cultural mix.  Sughdian, in the north of the country has a large 
Kyrgyz population, but was also the home to many Soviet elites in the pre-1989 period and may have 
been exposed to more secular influences.    
  To control for effects of economic cycle and other changes in context across years of birth, we 
include a complete set of year dummies (not reported in the tables). The birth year 2007 is the excluded 
category.  Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations for the included variables.  
To examine the relationship of household demand characteristics and service availability to use 
of services we develop a probit model:   
Pr(Y=1|X) = Ф(Xβ) 
where Y is the binary outcome (use of the service=1), X is a matrix of explanatory variables discussed 
above, Ф is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and  β is a vector of 
parameters.  We estimate this using Stata Statistical Software: Release 11.  We run the regressions as svy 
probit followed by the mfx command in Stata.  The mfx command presents the coefficients as marginal 
effects—the impact on the probability of care of a one unit change in the given independent variable, for 
someone who is at the mean on all independent variables.  Because no such person actually exists (and 
an individual with mean values sometimes lacks intuitive sense, as in the case of dummy variables), we 
also present results for a set of contrasting (“representative”) individuals, who have been selected to 
have very different predicted probabilities of care.   
  Because the data were collected using a two-staged random stratification based on urban and 
rural regions as well as population points, we rely on the “svy” commands in STATA to account for the stratified, cluster sampling design with weights (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group, 2011).  We 
estimate separate models of use of prenatal care and medical assistance at birth.  Results of the 
estimations can be found in Tables 3, 4a and 4b.   
 What Affects Receipt of Care?  
In Table 3, we begin with the baseline model of prenatal care use which incorporates standard 
variables explaining the use of maternal health care.  Here we model choice as in Figure 1.   In the 
second model, we include spouse’s education and that of the eldest female in the household, as proxies 
for the preferences of these household members, to measure their possible role in the care decision.   
We find that, as predicted by the model in Figure 1, education of the mother and log per capita 
household expenditure have a significant positive impact on getting prenatal care (Column 1), while 
being in a remote location with poor health quality has a significant negative impact (all three measures 
of access have the expected sign and are significant).  Having had more previous births also has the 
expected negative impact. There are also significant differences between regions, with residence in the 
regions of Khatlon and the RRS resulting in generally lower levels of care compared to Dushanbe, and 
residence in Sughd resulting in a greater likelihood of prenatal care.    
We use the same baseline model to examine factors related to having more than four prenatal 
visits (Column 3) and the use of professional medical  assistance at birth  (Column 5).  Mother’s 
education and household income positively affect attending more than four prenatal visits, as is living in 
Sughd, while living farther from a clinic, and living in Khatlon and the RRS provinces had a negative 
impact.  Survey year 2007 had a positive impact.  The other factors related to seeking care at least once 
(number of births and bad health quality) were not related to the likelihood of having at least four visits, 
suggesting possible distinct dynamics for the decision to go at all and the decision to go for multiple 
visits.  Factors related to use of professional assistance at birth are identical to those for having at least one prenatal visit, with the exception the later survey year was correlated with lower use of professional 
care, and residence in Sughd did not have a positive effect on receiving medical assistance.  In terms of 
magnitude, bad health care quality and income have a larger impact on the likelihood of prenatal care, 
while mother’s education and household income have more impact on professional assistance at birth.  
These findings largely confirm that the results of previous work hold for a more recent period, adding 
information on the impact of previous births.  
In columns 2, 4 and 6, we include the education of the spouse as a proxy for his preferences.  As 
can be seen in Table 3a, we find that spouse education is significantly (positively) correlated with both 
the use of prenatal care  and  the use of professional medical care at birth.  The impact of spouse 
education is significantly smaller than that of the education of the woman herself.  While spousal 
preferences appear to influence the decision to get prenatal care, they are not significantly related to the 
decision about number of prenatal visits.   
The model including the education of the eldest female (other than the respondent herself) is 
presented in Table 3b.  As noted above, these versions of the models rely on many fewer cases than the 
previous models.  The main variables—respondent education, household income, bad health quality and 
distance to clinic retain their sign and remain significant.  However, perhaps due to the fact that we 
include here only cases where the respondent lives with an older woman (often her mother-in-law, so 
possibly these are more traditional households), the level of education of the respondent herself is not 
significant in the predicting use of medical care at birth.  Spouse education remains significant in 
determining use of medical care at birth, and is a significant factor in the women attending more than 4 
prenatal visits, but the education of the elder female is not significant.  However, in the use of prenatal 
care, the education of the eldest female is significant and has a magnitude larger than that of the 
respondent herself.  In this case, spouse education is not significant.   Based on the regressions in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 3a and in those in Table 3b, we 
conclude that the woman does not make the decisions about care alone.  In the larger sample of all 
married couples,  both the woman’s preferences  and those of her spouse play a  role, although the 
women’s impact on the decision is more important.  However, in the smaller sample of respondents 
living with an elder female, the respondent’s education is less strongly associated with care use and in 
the case of using prenatal care the eldest female replaces the spouse as the other significant influence.  
In Tables 4a and 4b, we consider a number of factors which may influence the relative impact of 
the woman’s preferences on the use of prenatal care and professional medical assistance at birth, 
building on previous work.  As there was no evidence that household members other than the respondent 
participated in the decision whether to receive more than four prenatal visits, we do not add bargaining 
power measures to that model.  We include the bargaining power variables individually, and all together.  
Table 4a presents the results for use of prenatal care.  As can be seen, the results remain highly 
consistent with those of the baseline model. Education of the spouse and eldest female remain 
significant in all versions of the model. We find, however, that factors which might enhance women’s 
ability to survive economically on their own, relative to their spouse (relative education and 
employment), do not have a significant impact on the receipt of care.  While we present here only one 
measure for ability to earn income, other measures produced the same results (see footnote 13).  In a 
socially conservative country such as Tajikistan, where overall levels of female employment are low, 
and households headed by women of reproductive age are very rare, a threat to leave the relationship 
may not be credible, and education and labor force attachment may not affect bargaining power.     
One direct measure of women’s bargaining power on reproductive issues may be her ability to 
influence the decision to use contraceptives.  However, as see in Table 4a, opposition by the husband to 
the use of contraceptives does not have the expected negative relationship with use of prenatal care.  Perhaps women’s bargaining position on the two issues is governed by distinct norms (as suggested 
Furuta and Salway (2007)), or perhaps men’s  preferences about contraceptives differ from their 
preferences about prenatal care.   The data does not allow us to distinguish between these two possible 
explanations.  A second direct measure of women’s bargaining power, where the respondent is head of 
household, also has no impact on the use of prenatal care.  Including all of the sources of potential 
bargaining power in a single regression does not increase their significance, and an F-test does not find 
the bargaining power variables to have a significant impact when the effect of all four is measured 
together.   
Where women may need to bargain with an elder female when seeking prenatal care (Table 4b), 
we consider two measures of bargaining power: the respondent’s relative education and whether she 
participates in the labor force.  Controlling for these, the education of the eldest female has a significant 
impact on care use; neither measure of potential bargaining power is significantly related to the 
outcome.   
Table 5 presents the spouse bargaining models for use of professional assistance at birth.  As 
with prenatal care, the models including bargaining power measures are highly consistent with the 
previous model.  Spouse education is remains significantly correlated with the outcome.  Also as in the 
prenatal care model, we find no impact of measures of potential bargaining power—relative income and 
earning capacity.  Lack of bargaining power in the decision to use contraceptives is also unrelated, as is 
being the reported head of household.   This is true whether we include the variable alone, or with other 
bargaining power variables, and an F-test reveals no joint impact.  Relative education and participation 
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Independent Variables                         
  dF/dx  Robust 
SE 
dF/dx  Robust 
SE 
dF/dx  Robust 
SE 
dF/dx  Robust 
SE 
dF/dx  Robust 
SE 
dF/dx  Robust 
SE 
Edu of Mother (years)   0.011***  0.0034  0.009**  0.004  0.022***  0.006    0.020***  0.006  0.017***  0.004   0.015***  0.004   
Number of Births  -0.009***  0.003  -0.012***  0.003  0.007  0.005   0.007  0.005  -0.023***  0.004   -0.025***  0.004 
Log Per Cap Household 
Consumption 2007 USD 
 0.054***  0.014  0.055***  0.015  0.050***  0.022  0.056***  0.023  0.044***  0.016  0.041***  0.016 
Survey Year  2007  0.003  0.049  -0.014  0.041  0.124**  0.062  0.113*  0.062  -0.096*  0.057  -0.102*  0.056 
Bad Health Quality  -0.112***  0.042  -0.122***  0.041  -0.032  0.053  -0.030  0.054  -0.069*  0.037  -0.081**  0.036 
Population    0.000*  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000**  0.000    -0.000***  0.000 
Distance to Closest 
Clinic 
-0.003***  0.001 
-0.003*** 
0.001  -0.004***  0.000  0.004***  0.001  -0.005***  0.010  -0.005***  0.001 
Region Gorno  -0.002  0.037  -0.010  0.035  -0.025  0.045  -0.022  0.050  -0.068  0.052  -0.059  0.054 
Region Sughd    0.046*  0.032  0.052*  0.032  0.147***  0.053  0.154***  0.056  0.052  0.047  0.059  0.041 
Region Khatlon  -0.172***  0.040  -0.153***  0.039  -0.267***  0.033  -0.263***  0.036  -0.240***  0.045    -0.223***  0.045 
Region RRS^  -0.102***  0.034  -0.082***  0.032  -0.303***  0.032  -0.393***  0.034  -0.147***  0.036  -0.132***  0.036 
Spouse Education (yrs)      0.006*  0.003      -0.006  0.005      0.009***  0.004 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.   
^ Dushanbe is the excluded regional dummy.  
Notes: Sample includes only women with identifiable spouses whose last birth was within five years of the survey, except in Respondent is Head regression . 
Robust standard errors correct for impact of cluster sampling on standard errors. The regressions include individual year dummies for all birth years.  2007 is the 
excluded year. There are no significant birth years. Table 3b: Factors Associated with Maternal Care, Probit Model Using Pooled 2003 and 2007: 
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Independent Variables             
  dF/dx  Robust 
SE 
dF/dx  Robust 
SE 
dF/dx  Robust 
SE 
Edu of Mother (years)  0.006*  0.004  0.016*  0.009  0.007  0.005 
Number of Births  -0.008*  0.005  0.022**  0.011  -0.031***  0.006 
Log Per Cap Household 
Consumption 2007 USD 
0.051***  0.021  0.058*  0.034  0.055***  0.024 
Survey Year  2007  0.056  0.073  0.065  0.095  -0.036  0.072 
Bad Health Quality  -0.153***  0.050  -0.056  0.055  -0.116***  0.049 
Population  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000*  0.000 
Distance to Closest 
Clinic  -0.002*** 
0.001  -0.002  0.001  -0.004***  0.001 
Region Gorno  0.032  0.045  -0.002  0.082  -0.125*  0.073 
Region Sughd  0.067  0.043  0.163*  0.085  0.056  0.052 
Region Khatlon  -0.118*  0.066  -0.267***  0.057  -0.246***  0.061 
Region RRS^  -0.060  0.052  -0.327***  0.050  -0.174***  0.047 
Spouse Education (yrs)  0.004  0.003  0.015**  0.007  0.012***  0.005 
Eldest Female Edu(yrs)  0.008***  0.002  -0.006  0.004  0.003  0.003 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.   
^ Dushanbe is the excluded regional dummy.  
Notes: Sample includes only women with identifiable spouses whose last birth was within five years of the survey.  Robust 
standard errors correct for impact the complex stratified and clustered design. The regressions includes individual year 
dummies for all birth years.  2007 is the excluded year. There are no significant birth years in any regressions.   
 
  Overall, we find evidence that the woman shares decision-making about maternal health care 
with her spouse and also, in the decision to get prenatal care, with the eldest female in her household.  
However, we find no evidence that traditional measures of women’s potential bargaining power are 
related to her use of care.  Again, this result holds for the measures presented here, as well as a number of other measures.  We also do not find that a woman’s bargaining with her spouse over the use of 
contraceptives is related to her use of maternal health care. Recognition as head of household, a possible 
direct measure of bargaining power, also did not have a positive impact.     
These results highlight our currently limited capacity to measure bargaining power and to 
separate its impact from that of other variables (like preferences, for which education may be an 
imperfect proxy), and particularly our capacity to develop measures applicable across cultural contexts.  
Relative education and access to employment may make credible a bargaining threat where women can 
reliably form households of their own and seek employment to support these households.  But, as also 
noted by Ransul (2008), where social norms strongly discourage divorce (or female-headed households 
or even female employment), education and labor market attachment may not convey bargaining power. 
We find no evidence that a woman identified as head of household is more likely to get care.  In 
the context of the extended family networks and small, rural communities, perhaps even female heads of 
household do not make their own choices about care (which might involve travel in public transport and 
even fairly long absences from the household), but must bargain with other relatives or family members, 
so that even headship conveys limited bargaining power.  
Our results regarding the impact of (a lack of) bargaining power in contraceptive decisions about 
maternal health care provide further evidence that bargaining power varies across apparently similar 
contexts.  Social norms or other factors may provide bargaining power on some aspects of care but not 
on others, as found by Furuta and Salway (2006) and Bloom, Wypij and das Gupta (2001).    
Because of the small sample size in households where respondents had to bargain with elder 
females, we are less confident about the results of those tests.  However, they provide preliminary 
evidence that elder females do participate in care decisions, and that relative education and income 
earning capacity do not affect the outcome of bargaining. A question that we were not able to investigate with the Tajikistan data is whether the assets that 
women bring into the household convey power in this context, where a woman might threaten to return 
to the parental household, resulting in the loss of assets by the husband’s household.  Another important 
question which we were also not able to answer with available data is the way that women’s services 
within the household might impact on bargaining power in the context where a threat to leave is not 
credible. 
  Finally, the type of survey data currently available also do not allow us to adequately distinguish 
between women’s bargaining power and their underlying preferences.  Education is often used as a 
proxy for preferences, assuming that more educated people prefer more care.  But this may not always 
be true.  Perhaps highly religious but relatively well-educated women do not prefer more care, at least in 
a context when the majority of doctors are male.
xiv  When asked about the reasons for not getting 
prenatal care, about 23% of non-recipients in both years responded that they were “ashamed,”
xv and the 
rate of this response did not differ significantly by education.  Malapit (2009) also notes that observable 
measures of the unobservable characteristic “bargaining power” may be instead capturing other 
unobservable characteristics.  Without a direct measure of preferences on the issue of care, we cannot be 
sure whether, for example, relatively educated women who do not receive care lack bargaining power in 
the decision they share with their spouse, or whether they do not prefer care.   Table 4a: Bargaining Power Variables Associated with Prenatal Care, Probit Model Using Pooled 2003 and 2007 Data, Spouse Model 
Dependent Variable:  Prenatal Consult 
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Independent Variables                     
  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE 
Edu of Mother   0.009**  0.004  0.008*  0.004  0.009**  0.004  0.008**  0.004  0.011***  0.003 
Number of Births  -0.011***  0.003  -0.011***  0.003  -0.011***  0.003  -0.011***  0.003  -0.010***  0.003 
Log Per Cap Expenditure  0.056***  0.015  0.055***  0.014  0.056***  0.015  0.056***  0.014  0.050***  0.013 
Year Dummy 2007  -0.015  0.049  -0.015  0.049  -0.018  0.050  -0.019  0.050  -0.004  0.046 
Bad Health Quality   -0.122***  0.041  -0.122***  0.041  -0.122***  0.041  -0.122***  0.041  -0.103***  0.039 
Population  0.000*  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000*  0.000  0.000*  0.000 
Distance to Closest Clinic  -0.003***  0.001  -0.002***  0.001  -0.003***  0.001  -0.003***  0.001  -0.002***  0.001 
Region Gorno  0.011  0.035  0.009  0.035  0.008  0.035  0.010  0.035  -0.008  0.035 
Region Sughd  0.052*  0.032  0.052*  0.032  0.051  0.031  0.052*  0.031  0.048  0.030 
Region Khatlon  -0.152***  0.039  -0.152***  0.039  -0.153***  0.039  -0.151***  0.039  -0.174***  0.039 
Region RRS^  -0.080***  0.032  -0.081***  0.031  -0.081***  0.032  -0.079***  0.031  -0.107***  0.031 
Spouse Education  0.005*  0.003  0.006*  0.003  0.005*  0.003  0.006*  0.003     
Woman in Labor Force  -0.004  0.015          -0.003  0.015     
Woman’s Education 
Exceeds Spouse’s 
    0.022  0.027      0.023  0.026     
Husband Opposed 
Contraceptives  
        -0.016  0.023  -0.016  0.024     
Respondent Head                   0.009  0.029 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.   
^ Dushanbe is the excluded regional dummy.  
Notes: Sample includes only women with identifiable spouses whose last birth was within five years of the survey, except in Respondent is Head regression.  
Robust standard errors correct for impact the complex stratified and clustered design. The regressions includes individual year dummies for all birth years.  2007 
is the excluded year. There are no significant birth years.Table 4b: Bargaining Power Variables Associated with Prenatal Care, Probit Model Using 
Pooled 2003 and 2007 Data, Elder Female Model 
Dependent Variable:  Prenatal Consult 
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Independent Variables             
  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE 
Edu of Mother   0.006*  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.005  0.004 
Number of Births  -0.008*  0.005  -0.008*  0.005  -0.008*  0.005 
Log Per Cap Expenditure  0.052***  0.021  0.051***  0.021  0.051***  0.021 
Year Dummy 2007  0.051  0.072  0.063  0.073  0.059  0.072 
Bad Health Quality   -0.153***  0.051  -0.154***  0.051  -0.154***  0.051 
Population  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Distance to Closest Clinic  -0.002***  0.001  -0.002***  0.001  -0.002***  0.001 
Region Gorno  0.036  0.045  0.031  0.047  0.035  0.045 
Region Sughd  0.068  0.043  0.068  0.043  0.068  0.043 
Region Khatlon  -0.115*  0.066  -0.119*  0.067  -0.115*  0.066 
Region RRS^  -0.056  0.051  -0.061  0.052  -0.057  0.052 
Spouse Education  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.003 
Education of Eldest 
Female in Household 
0.008***  0.002  0.010***  0.003  0.010***  0.003 
Woman in Labor Force  -0.010  0.018      -0.010  0.018 
Woman’s Education 
Exceeds Education of 
Eldest Female in the 
Household 
    0.019  0.025  0.018  0.025 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.   
^ Dushanbe is the excluded regional dummy.  
Notes: Sample includes only women with identifiable spouses whose last birth was within five years of the 
survey.  Robust standard errors correct for impact the complex stratified and clustered design. The 
regressions includes individual year dummies for all birth years.  2007 is the excluded year. There are no 
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Independent Variables                     
  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE  dF/dx  SE 
Edu of Mother (years)  0.015***  0.004  0.013***  0.004  0.015***  0.004  0.013***  0.004  0.015***  0.004 
Number of Births  -0.025***  0.004  -0.025***  0.004  -0.025***  0.004  -0.025***  0.004  -0.023***  0.004 
Log PerCap Expenditure  0.041***  0.016  0.040***  0.016  0.041***  0.016  0.041***  0.016  0.033**  0.015 
Year Dummy 2007  -0.104*  0.056  -0.102*  0.056  -0.109*  0.056  -0.111**  0.056  -0.082  0.054 
Bad Health Quality  -0.080**  0.036  -0.080**  0.036  -0.080**  0.036  -0.080**  0.037  -0.093***  0.034 
Population  0.000***  0.000  0.000***  0.000  0.000***  0.000  0.000***  0.000  0.000***  0.000 
Distance to Closest Clinic  -0.005***  0.001  -0.005***  0.001  -0.004***  0.001  -0.005***  0.001  -0.005***  0.001 
Region Gorno  -0.053  0.053  -0.059  0.053  -0.061  0.053  -0.056  0.053  -0.074  0.051 
Region Sughd  0.060  0.041  0.060  0.041  0.058  0.042  0.061  0.041  0.052  0.039 
Region Khatlon  -0.221***  0.045  0.222***  0.045  0.224***  0.045  -0.221***  0.045  -0.236***  0.044 
Region RRS  -0.126***  0.036  -0.129***  0.036  -0.128***  0.036  -0.123***  0.036  -0.144***  0.034 
Spouse Education (yrs)  0.010***  0.004  0.012***  0.004  0.010***  0.003  0.012***  0.004     
Woman in Labor Force  -0.010  0.017          -0.009  0.016     
Woman’s Education 
Exceeds Spouse’s  
    0.032  0.032      0.034  0.032     
Spouse Opposes 
Contraceptives  
        -0.034  0.025  -0.034  0.026     
Respondent Head                  0.054  0.036 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.   
^ Dushanbe is the excluded regional dummy. Notes: Sample includes only women with identifiable spouses whose last birth was within five years of the survey.  
Robust standard errors correct for impact the complex stratified and clustered design. The regressions includes individual year dummies for all birth years.  2007 
is the excluded year. There are no significant birth years.Who Gets Care? 
To provide a clearer sense of the impact of the variables considered here on women’s use of care, 
we create six “representative people” using the results from the full bargaining power regression to 
predict their probability of care.
xvi
To estimate the probability of getting prenatal care, we initially assign the disadvantaged woman 
and her spouse an 8
th grade education.  Her household has income at the 25
th percentile, she lives in a 
remote population point in socially conservative Khatlon province, where health care quality is bad, and 
the distance to the closest clinic is at the 75
th percentile.  She has given birth four times.  We compare 
her predicted outcome  with that of a relatively advantaged woman.  This woman has  per capita 
household has income at the 75% percentile.  She does not live in Khatlon province.  Her population 
point is at the 75
th percentile of population and the distance she travels to the closest clinic is at the 25
th 
percentile.  Her population point does not have bad health care quality. In the initial estimate, the 
spouses both have 14 years of education. Like her disadvantaged counterpart, she has also given birth 
four times, and the eldest female in her household has nine years of education.  
 We examine two contrasting types of women.  One has the deck 
stacked against her on the significant variables, while the other is advantaged in the terms of these 
variables.  To highlight the relative role of the proxies for woman’s preferences and those of her spouse, 
we compare three possible situations for each of the two types of women.  We estimate the probability 
of using care for the situation where the respondent and her spouse have equal education (eight years for 
the disadvantaged woman and 14 for the advantaged woman), and then contrast this outcome with that 
predicted when the respondent’s education changes versus that when her spouse’s education changes. 
The results of this comparison are presented in Table 6.  They show very significant differences 
between the advantaged and disadvantaged women in the probability of getting care.  While the 
disadvantaged woman has only a very low probability of getting prenatal care, her advantaged counterpart has a probability of nearly 100%.  The difference in probability of receiving professional 
care at birth is even greater.   The large differences confirm the central importance of household income, 
education, and region of residence in the use of care shown by Falkingham (2003) and Habibov and Fan 
(2008). 
Comparing the predicted outcomes when varying the education of the respondent and her spouse 
illustrates women’s relative role in choosing care.  For the disadvantaged woman, an increase in her 
education to 14 years (holding her spouse’s education constant at eight years) increases her probability 
of getting prenatal care by about 9 percentage points.  Increasing her spouse’s education (while holding 
hers constant at eight  years)  increases her probability of receiving care less.  In the case of the 
advantaged woman (where both spouses are assumed to have 14 years of education), a reduction in her 
education to eight years reduces her likelihood of getting care slightly, while a reduction in her spouse’s 
education has more  impact.   Comparing the impact of the educational levels of spouses on the 
likelihood of receiving professional care at birth similarly illustrates the greater impact of women’s 
education.   
 
Discussion 
Our examination of the use of maternal health care services in Tajikistan reveals a continuation 
of the decline in service use documented by Jane Falkingham (2003) on the basis of the 1999 TLSS, 
followed by a partial and inconsistent recovery.  This trend undermines improvement in maternal and 
infant outcomes in Tajikistan and the attainment of Tajikistan’s Millennium Development Goals.   
 
 
 Table 6: Representative Women 
  Probability of 
Prenatal Care 
Probability of Professional 
Care at Birth 
CASE     
Disadvantaged* 
      Income at 25
th percentile 
      Remote location 
      Khatlon province 
      Poor health care quality 
   
Both eight years education   0.338  0.197 
Respondent eight years, spouse 14   0.396  0.267 
Respondent  14 years, spouse eight  0.434  0.302 
Advantaged* 
      Income at 75
th percentile 
      Not Remote location 
      Not Khatlon province 
      Not poor health quality 
   
Both 14 years education   0.973  0.968 
Respondent 14 years, spouse eight    0.952  0.936 
Respondent eight years, spouse 14    0.961  0.948 
*Both sets of examples have four previous births. 
  Our work confirms previous findings (Falkingham, 2003; Habibov and Fan, 2008) in showing 
that income, mother’s education, and access to quality care influence the use of care.  Region of 
residence also plays a role, even after controlling for income and access—living in the more socially 
conservative regions of Khatlon and the RRS has a consistent negative impact on using care. Further, we 
show that women are less likely to seek professional assistance at birth if they have previously had more 
children, confirming a similar finding for Turkey (Celik and Hotchkiss, 2000).   
  To date, research on the use of maternal health care has not specifically addressed the question of 
who decides whether to get such care.  A well-established correlation between women’s education and their care use has been used to suggest that more educated women prefer more care, but also that more 
educated women are more valued by other household decision-makers.  Our results suggest that women 
share the decision-making with other household members, as the education of both spouse and eldest 
female in the household are significantly correlated with outcomes, controlling for the respondent’s 
education (and in the context of reasonably low correlations between spouses’ education levels).  Our 
presentation of probabilities of care for women with different characteristics illustrates the impact of 
variations in male and female education on outcomes, highlighting that female education has a stronger 
impact.  This may be because women’s preferences are more important in the decision to get care, or 
because an increase in women’s education not only changes women’s preferences, but also the way they 
are valued by other household members involved in the decision. 
  Our attempts to identify factors which might increase women’s bargaining power produced 
mixed results, however.  Measures of power derived from women’s relative ability to survive 
economically on their own (their relative education and labor market participation) were not related to 
care use.  Nor was a direct measure of bargaining power in a related context—the husband’s opposition 
the use of contraceptives.  Women who were identified as head of household (another direct measure of 
power) were more likely  to get professional care at birth—by a large margin in the case of 
disadvantaged women.   
Following other recent work (Rasul, 2007; Bloom, Wypij and das Gupta, 2001), we conclude 
that effective measures of bargaining power require careful tailoring to local conditions.  We extend the 
idea of Rasul (2007) that social norms against divorce may limit the impact of education on bargaining 
power, noting that limited female labor force participation may have the same effect. Where women 
cannot  threaten to set up independent households, women’s  power to withhold services within the 
household, or to return to their parents’ home (with their assets), may be more important sources of power. Future surveys which provide strong proxies for the value of women’s assets and their services 
in the home, as well as direct questions decision-making on a variety of issues, will allow researchers to 
more effectively measure bargaining power in diverse contexts.  Direct questions about preferences will 
also help distinguish between the impact of preferences and that of bargaining power.  
Returning to the immediate problem of increasing care use in Tajikistan, our results suggest that 
a mix of policies is important.  One obvious issue is the relative cost of services, given low incomes.  
Costs include  not only direct costs, but also bribes and  gifts  to poorly-paid health care providers 
(Dabalen and Wane, 2008), supplies which must be brought by patients, and transportation.  In 2004, the 
government passed a pilot program in 2 rayons (counties) which guarantees free primary health care 
consultations and free prenatal care and hospital care for birthing (UNDP, 2005).  Broader programs like 
this may be important in increasing use of maternal health care.  Habibov (2009) discusses in detail 
some alternative ways to deal with cost, including community-based health insurance and careful 
targeting of programs. 
Lack of access to quality care is also a shown be a contributing factor to low levels of maternal 
care use.  The Safe Maternity program (2000-2010), supported by the Tajikistan Ministry of Health and 
the World Health Organization includes measures to increase the presence of qualified gynecologists in 
the provinces (Hasanova, 2008).  A 2007 study by Mirzoev, Green and Newell (2007), however, finds 
slow progress in implementing reforms. 
Education (of both men and women) also plays an important role.  This suggests that declining 
enrollment rates are an issue for maternal health policy which has not yet been incorporated into efforts 
to address low levels of maternal health care use (an gap also noted by Mavjouda Hasanova, writing on 
health policy in 2008).  This creates opportunities for the government to realize synergies in spending 
across sectors. Given the important differences in use of care in social conservative provinces and the role of modesty in the choice to use care, policies to increase outreach to women in the home, and to 
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1This positive relationship with prenatal care has not been found universally, however.  Shiffman (2000) finds that while 
assistance in childbirth does have a positive impact, the same cannot be shown for use of prenatal care using cross-country 
aggregate data. 
2 We include as “Medical Professional” a doctor or nurse.   
3 Russian Orthodox and other Christians probably make up less than 5% of the population (Curtis, 1996; TLSS, 1999; 2003). 
4 The use of sample weights has been the subject of much debate.  If the parameter one seeks to estimate is heterogeneous 
across people, then neither the weighted nor the unweighted results will yield a consistent estimate of the population mean of 
that parameter.  On the other hand, if the parameter is in fact the same for all people, then the unweighted results are to be 
preferred, as they are more efficient.  Thus, the weights distort the collected data but do not result in an efficient estimate 
(Deaton, 1997).  We choose to use the weights to keep our work as comparable as possible with the other research.  We have 
also performed the analysis without weights, however, and the results are comparable in both their implications and 
significance.  
5 Other work on this issue (Falkingham, 2003, Habibov and Fan, 2008) appears to have included all births reported in the 
sample. 
6 As our sample includes only women with identifiable spouses, the results are valid only for this group.  However, as we 
note, the results are very similar to those found by Habibov and Fan (2008) and Falkingham (2003), who included all women 
who answered the questions regarding their last pregnancy.  All researchers using this data must exclude the women who did 
not respond to questions about their last pregnancy.  These might be women who are very conservative, or who had very                                                                                                                                                                    
negative experiences in pregnancy.  That might result in an under-sampling of such women, but it is not clear why such 
exclusion would bias the results in any predictable way.  
7 We also examined a third outcome, birthing in a medical facility. The results were not significantly different from the 
results regarding the more general question of the presence of skilled assistance at birth, so we present the results for only 
two outcomes.   
8Habibov and Fan (2009) use a two-stage ZINB regression method to model number of visits given a decision to seek 
prenatal care at all using just the 2003 data.  Due to the apparently inconsistent way that the data on number of prenatal visits 
was collected in 2003 and 2007, we chose to instead to follow Hotchkiss (2001) in presenting svy probit results for a dummy 
for multiple visits.  In 2003, the number of visits varies between 1 and 9.  In 2007, the number of visits varies between 1and 
36, with 5% of the sample reporting over 13 visits.  It appears that the question was not asked, or coded, the same way in 
both years, and as a result we were disinclined to use all the data on number of visits.  However, we performed two 
robustness tests for our modeling choice.  First, to check for sensitivity to our choice of 4 visits for our dummy variable, we 
re-ran the regressions using a dummy for more than 3 visits and also for more than 5 visits. The results are identical, except 
that in the case of more than 5 visits the number of previous births has a significant positive impact.  Second, we followed 
Habibov and Fan (2009) in running a ZINB.  The results for the second stage (the number of visits, given that at least one 
visit would occur) were identical to those resulting from the svy probit regressions presented here for the dummy variable 
Greater than 4 Visits in sign and significance, with one exception.  Number of Births is significant in the ZINB but 
significant in the probit version only in the robustness test where we used a dummy for greater than 5 visits.  The ZINB 
results are available from the authors.    
9 Both the 2003 and 2007 surveys include information on the existence of and distance to both the closest polyclinic and 
women’s clinic.  We use the shorter of these two distances. 
10 The correlation between a woman’s education and that of her spouse is 0.35; correlation between the woman and the eldest 
female interactive variable is 0.16.    
11 The regressions control for the education of both the woman and her spouse, and continuous measures of relative education 
are co-linear with those variables.   
12 Labor force participation is low and data on employment was very incomplete.  Among women who provided full answers 
to the work questions, the vast majority those who worked were employed full time.  There was little variation across 
different possible measures of access to income (hours worked, weeks worked) and the choice of measure did not affect the 
outcome. 
13 There is very little correlation between these bargaining power variables.  Correlation coefficients range from -0.0027 
(between the dummy for employed  and female head) to 0.0945 (between the education of the eldest female and that of the 
spouse). 
xiv Only about a third of doctors in Tajikistan are female, which may contribute to these feelings of being “ashamed,” 
especially in the context of a resurgence of more strict interpretations of Islam.  Gorno-Badakhshian, which has significantly 
higher levels of use of maternal health services, also has the highest share of female doctors, 67% (Dabalen and Wane, 2008).  
xv This was a closed question, and most options reflected an underlying model as in Figure 1.  No options were offered 
regarding the woman’s role in the choice.   
xvi The care probabilities reported are calculated using Stata's "adjust" command, which calculates the predicted values for a 
person with the specified characteristics, derived from the probit regression equation.  